simbiot-harness/venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/mcp/server/auth/handlers/token.py
Simbiot Harness b60439152b Simbiot Harness v0.1: тактовая лестница на Strands + CQRS/ES-спина
- harness/es.py: append-only event store + проекции (образец — кооп-портал)
- harness/levels.py: уровни 1с/1м/1ч/1д, контекст ∝ масштабу
- harness/scheduler.py: уровневые потоки, идемпотентные тики, absorbed-стабы
- harness/isolated_runner.py + _llm_worker.py: LLM-тик в сабпроцессе
  (глобальный asyncio-рантайм Strands не переживает 2+ create_harness)
- cli.py: init/task/tasks/status/events + requeue (написан самим минутным агентом)
- 9router: отдельный ключ sk-simbiot, модель auto (glm-5.3 первым)
2026-09-29 15:28:50 +00:00

275 lines
12 KiB
Python

import base64
import hashlib
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Annotated, Any, Literal
from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl, AnyUrl, BaseModel, Field, TypeAdapter, ValidationError
from starlette.requests import Request
from mcp.server.auth.errors import stringify_pydantic_error
from mcp.server.auth.json_response import PydanticJSONResponse
from mcp.server.auth.middleware.client_auth import AuthenticationError, ClientAuthenticator
from mcp.server.auth.provider import (
IdentityAssertionParams,
OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider,
TokenError,
TokenErrorCode,
)
from mcp.shared.auth import OAuthToken
class AuthorizationCodeRequest(BaseModel):
# See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.3
grant_type: Literal["authorization_code"]
code: str = Field(..., description="The authorization code")
redirect_uri: AnyUrl | None = Field(None, description="Must be the same as redirect URI provided in /authorize")
client_id: str
# we use the client_secret param, per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-2.3.1
client_secret: str | None = None
# See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636#section-4.5
code_verifier: str = Field(..., description="PKCE code verifier")
# RFC 8707 resource indicator
resource: str | None = Field(None, description="Resource indicator for the token")
class RefreshTokenRequest(BaseModel):
# See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-6
grant_type: Literal["refresh_token"]
refresh_token: str = Field(..., description="The refresh token")
scope: str | None = Field(None, description="Optional scope parameter")
client_id: str
# we use the client_secret param, per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-2.3.1
client_secret: str | None = None
# RFC 8707 resource indicator
resource: str | None = Field(None, description="Resource indicator for the token")
class JwtBearerRequest(BaseModel):
# RFC 7523 §2.1 JWT bearer authorization grant. SEP-990 leg 2: the client presents the
# enterprise IdP-issued ID-JAG to the MCP authorization server as the `assertion`.
grant_type: Literal["urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer"]
# See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7523#section-2.1
assertion: str = Field(..., description="The ID-JAG (a signed JWT) being presented as the grant")
scope: str | None = Field(None, description="Optional scope parameter")
client_id: str
# we use the client_secret param, per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-2.3.1
client_secret: str | None = None
# RFC 8707 resource indicator
resource: str | None = Field(None, description="Resource indicator for the token")
TokenRequest = Annotated[
AuthorizationCodeRequest | RefreshTokenRequest | JwtBearerRequest,
Field(discriminator="grant_type"),
]
token_request_adapter = TypeAdapter[TokenRequest](TokenRequest)
class TokenErrorResponse(BaseModel):
"""See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.2"""
error: TokenErrorCode
error_description: str | None = None
error_uri: AnyHttpUrl | None = None
# this is just an alias over OAuthToken; the only reason we do this
# is to have some separation between the HTTP response type, and the
# type returned by the provider
TokenSuccessResponse = OAuthToken
@dataclass
class TokenHandler:
provider: OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider[Any, Any, Any]
client_authenticator: ClientAuthenticator
identity_assertion_enabled: bool = False
def response(self, obj: TokenSuccessResponse | TokenErrorResponse):
status_code = 200
if isinstance(obj, TokenErrorResponse):
status_code = 400
return PydanticJSONResponse(
content=obj,
status_code=status_code,
headers={
"Cache-Control": "no-store",
"Pragma": "no-cache",
},
)
async def handle(self, request: Request):
try:
client_info = await self.client_authenticator.authenticate_request(request)
except AuthenticationError as e:
# Authentication failures should return 401
return PydanticJSONResponse(
content=TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_client",
error_description=e.message,
),
status_code=401,
headers={
"Cache-Control": "no-store",
"Pragma": "no-cache",
},
)
try:
form_data = await request.form()
# TODO(Marcelo): Can someone check if this `dict()` wrapper is necessary?
token_request = token_request_adapter.validate_python(dict(form_data))
except ValidationError as validation_error:
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_request",
error_description=stringify_pydantic_error(validation_error),
)
)
if token_request.grant_type not in client_info.grant_types:
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="unsupported_grant_type",
error_description=(f"Unsupported grant type (supported grant types are {client_info.grant_types})"),
)
)
tokens: OAuthToken
match token_request:
case AuthorizationCodeRequest():
auth_code = await self.provider.load_authorization_code(client_info, token_request.code)
if auth_code is None or auth_code.client_id != token_request.client_id:
# if code belongs to different client, pretend it doesn't exist
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_grant",
error_description="authorization code does not exist",
)
)
# make auth codes expire after a deadline
# see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.5
if auth_code.expires_at < time.time():
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_grant",
error_description="authorization code has expired",
)
)
# verify redirect_uri doesn't change between /authorize and /tokens
# see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.6
if auth_code.redirect_uri_provided_explicitly:
authorize_request_redirect_uri = auth_code.redirect_uri
else: # pragma: no cover
authorize_request_redirect_uri = None
# Convert both sides to strings for comparison to handle AnyUrl vs string issues
token_redirect_str = str(token_request.redirect_uri) if token_request.redirect_uri is not None else None
auth_redirect_str = (
str(authorize_request_redirect_uri) if authorize_request_redirect_uri is not None else None
)
if token_redirect_str != auth_redirect_str:
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_request",
error_description=("redirect_uri did not match the one used when creating auth code"),
)
)
# Verify PKCE code verifier
sha256 = hashlib.sha256(token_request.code_verifier.encode()).digest()
hashed_code_verifier = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(sha256).decode().rstrip("=")
if hashed_code_verifier != auth_code.code_challenge:
# see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636#section-4.6
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_grant",
error_description="incorrect code_verifier",
)
)
try:
# Exchange authorization code for tokens
tokens = await self.provider.exchange_authorization_code(client_info, auth_code)
except TokenError as e:
return self.response(TokenErrorResponse(error=e.error, error_description=e.error_description))
case RefreshTokenRequest():
refresh_token = await self.provider.load_refresh_token(client_info, token_request.refresh_token)
if refresh_token is None or refresh_token.client_id != token_request.client_id:
# if token belongs to different client, pretend it doesn't exist
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_grant",
error_description="refresh token does not exist",
)
)
if refresh_token.expires_at and refresh_token.expires_at < time.time():
# if the refresh token has expired, pretend it doesn't exist
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_grant",
error_description="refresh token has expired",
)
)
# Parse scopes if provided
scopes = token_request.scope.split(" ") if token_request.scope else refresh_token.scopes
for scope in scopes:
if scope not in refresh_token.scopes:
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="invalid_scope",
error_description=(f"cannot request scope `{scope}` not provided by refresh token"),
)
)
try:
# Exchange refresh token for new tokens
tokens = await self.provider.exchange_refresh_token(client_info, refresh_token, scopes)
except TokenError as e:
return self.response(TokenErrorResponse(error=e.error, error_description=e.error_description))
case JwtBearerRequest(): # pragma: no branch
if not self.identity_assertion_enabled:
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="unsupported_grant_type",
error_description="The JWT bearer grant is not supported by this authorization server",
)
)
# SEP-990 §5.1: only confidential clients may present an ID-JAG. ClientAuthenticator
# already rejects a secret-based method with no stored secret; this additionally
# rejects the public `none` method so an unauthenticated client never reaches the
# provider hook.
if not client_info.client_secret:
# RFC 6749 §5.2: the client authenticated but is not permitted this grant, so
# unauthorized_client (not invalid_client, which is for failed authentication).
return self.response(
TokenErrorResponse(
error="unauthorized_client",
error_description="The JWT bearer grant requires a confidential client",
)
)
params = IdentityAssertionParams(
assertion=token_request.assertion,
scopes=token_request.scope.split(" ") if token_request.scope else None,
resource=token_request.resource,
)
try:
tokens = await self.provider.exchange_identity_assertion(client_info, params)
except TokenError as e:
return self.response(TokenErrorResponse(error=e.error, error_description=e.error_description))
return self.response(tokens)